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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
~'HE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE ~ 
'V 11~STFJRN R A I L R 0 AD COM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Plailnt~ff, 
v. 
Pl. TBLTC SERVICE COMMISSION I 
OF lTTAH and STATE ROAD COM-
~II~~ION OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
9727 
PLAINTIF'F'S BRIEF 
STATEMEN·T OF TIRE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to review an order of the defendant 
Public Service Commission of Utah requiring plaintiff 
The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company 
to contribute ten per cent of the cost of erecting a high-
way structure on U. S. Highway 6-50, overpassing a 
railroad industry spur designated as Gomex Spur in 
Utah County, Utah. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE T'HE PUBLIC 
SERVICE COMMISSION OF U'TAH 
The proceeding was heard before defendant Public 
Service Commission of rtah on the petition of defendant 
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2 
State Road Commission of Utah 1n which proceeding 
defendant Public Service Commission of Utah ordered 
plaintiff to contribute ten per cent of the cost of the 
overpass structure. Plaintiff brings the matter before 
this Court on petition to review said order. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON R-EVIEW 
Plaintiff seeks to have the order of defendant Publjc 
Service Commission of Utah set aside. 
ST1ATEMENT' OF FACTS 
In this brief the parties will for convenience be 
designated as follows : Plaintiff as "Rio Grande;'' de-
fendant Public Service Commission of Utah as "Public 
Service Commission;" and defendant State Road Com-
mission of Utah as "State Road Commission.'' 
State Road Commission is engaged in a project for 
the widening of U. S. Highway 6-50 in Utah County, 
Utah. A portion of such project includes the area where 
said highway departs from the confines of Spanish Fnl"k 
Canyon and running in a northwesterly direction enters 
the Utah Valley. In this area the· main line of Rio Grande 
is located southerly of said highway and roughly parallel 
thereto (R. 1-11, 86). In 1940, Illinois Powder Company 
established a plant near the base of the Wasatch Moun-
t-ains northerly of both said highway and Rio Grande's 
main line. This plant, together ·with its appurtenant rail 
facilities, is now owned by American Cyanamid Com-
pany. The plant established by Illinois Powder Company 
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3 
and prp::;ently mnwd by American Cyanamid Company 
i14 lo<'ntP(l in ~Pdion 34, Township 8 South, Range 3 
11:n~t, Nalt IJakP ~leridian. At the time of the establish-
tmmt of this plant, Rio Grande conveyed to the Powder 
Colllpany all of its interest in the northeast quarter of 
tlw southeast quarter of said Section 34, except for the 
owlH.'r~hip of the right of way for its main line, (R. 64-71) 
and under date of 1\farch 20, 1940, entered into a track-
age agreetnent with the Powder Company (R. 9·2-95, Ex. 
6). This agreement provides for the construction at the 
expense of the Powder Company of certain spur track-
agt' connecting into the main line of Rio Grande· in the 
southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of said Section 
:l-t: and extending northwesterly a distance of 3,873 feet. 
Tradmge northerly of the forty-acre· line running east 
and west through the center of the southeast quarter of 
::;aid Section 34, under said agreement, became the pro-
perty of the Powder Company and trackage south of such 
forty-acre line became the property of Rio Grande. In 
its portion of the trackage the Powder Company owned 
the roadbed, the ties, rails and fastenings, bridge and 
building material, and Rio Grande had no right, title or 
interest in said trackage or the materials constituting 
the same. Rio Grande was denied any right of way over 
the property of the Powder Company and also denried 
the right to use the trackage on the Powder Company 
property for its own business or for the business of any 
other shipper and prevented from extending such track-
age to serve any other industry. The agreement further 
provides that the traakage should be operated only so 
long as the business of the Powder Company justified 
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4 
such operation, and that trackage owned by the Powder 
Company should be maintained at its expense, and should 
it fail to do so, Rio Grande might disconnect such 
trackage from its rails ( R. 92-95, Ex. 6). 
The spur track in question was constructed and is 
now operated pursuant to this agreement. As shown by 
R. 86, Ex. 2, there is doubt as to the true location of 
said forty-acre line, two lines being shown, one desig-
nated as "40 acre line," the other as "40 acre line as 
located by Utah Railway Company." No evidence being 
introduced showing how Utah Railway Company unde,r-
took to establish the line, it is assumed for the purpose 
of this brief that the other line is accurately located. 
Movements of traffic into and out from the Ameri-
can Cyanamid plant are handled by Rio Grande switch 
crews operating out of Provo. No regular schedules are 
employed but the traffic is moved on an "on call" basis. 
About two trips each week or about eight trips each 
month are made to the plant. No other industries what-
ever are served over this spur and none may he served 
under the provisions of the trackage agreement (R. 52-59, 
R. 91, Ex. 5, R. 92-95, Ex. 6). 
By reference to the print attached to the trackage 
agreement (R. 95, Ex. 6) and the State Road Commission 
Map (R. 86, Ex. 2) it is seen that the ownership of Rio 
Grande terminates at said forty-acre line, that the spur 
track in question intersects the center line of the existing 
highway approximately at the point where said track 
crosses said forty-acre line, and that the proposed struc-
ture (outlined in pencil) will be located astride said 
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fortv -acre line, being partly on the property of Rio 
Grande and partly on the property of American Cyana-
mid Company, the ext~nt to which such structure 
occupies the property of either company depending upon 
the true location of said forty-acre line. 
Trains moving cars into and out from the Cyanamid 
Plant are stopped prior to entering the crossing and the 
train is flagged over the crossing by members of the 
train crew. There has never been a recorded accident 
at the rrossing (R. 52-59). 
The usual practice of Rio Grande under its operating 
rulP8 in the Salt Lal\:e District, in the absence of other 
crossing protection, is to protect movements across high-
ways on industry spurs by train crews flagging the 
movement across the highway (R. 62). 
ARGUMEN·T 
POINT I. 
THE POWER AND· JURISDIOTION OF THE 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
DOES NOT· EXTE.ND TO ·THE· APPORTION-
MENT OF THE COSTS OF A GRAD·E 
SEP AR.ATION OVER T~ HE RAILROAD 
SPUR TRACK INVOLVED IN THIS CASE. 
The Public Service Commission is a statutory crea-
ture of the State of Utah, deriving its power from the 
legislature. It has no inherent power, and the source of 
such power as it undertakes to exercise must be found in 
some statute. Ba.mberger Electric R.R., et .al. v. Public 
UtilitZ:es Commission of Utah, 59 Utah 351, 204 Pac. 314; 
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State v. -Nelson, 65 Utah 157, 238 Pae. 237; Logan Gil!! v. 
Public Ut1~lities Commission, 77 Utah 442, 296 Pac. 1006; 
Garkane Potoer Co. v. Public Se·rvice Commission, 98 
Utah 466, 100 P. 2d 571; Coun.ty Water System, et al. v. 
Salt Lake City, et al., 3 Utah 2d 46, 278 P. 2d 285. 
The jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission 
over the subject of highway grade separations is found 
in Section 54-4-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which 
provides as follows: 
'' 54-4-15. Grade crossings-Regulation.-(1) 
No track of any railroad shall be constructed 
across a public road, highway or street at grade, 
nor shall the track of any railroad corporation be 
constructed across the track of any other rail-
road or street railroad corporation at grade·, nor 
shall the track of a stre·et railroad corporation be 
constructed across the track of a railroad cor-
poration at grade, without the permission of the 
commission having first been secured; provided, 
that this subsection shall not apply to the re-
placement of lawfully existing tracks. T'he com-
mission shall have the right to refuse its 
permission or to grant it upon such terms and 
conditions as it may prescribe. 
( 2) The commission shall have the exclusive 
power to determine and prescribe the manneT, 
including the particular point of crossing, and 
the terms of installation, operation, maintenance, 
use and protection of each crossing of one rail-
road by another railroad or street railroad, and 
of a street railroad by a railroad and of each 
crossing of a public road or highway by a railroad 
or street railroad, and of a street by a railroad 
or vice versa, and to alter or abolish any such 
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erossing, to restrict the use of such crossings to 
<'Prtnin typ·es of traffic in the interest of public 
safety and is vested with power and it shall be its 
< lu ty to designate the railroad crossings to be 
traversed by school busses and motor vehicles 
earrying passengers for hire, ·and to require, 
where in its judgment it would he practicable, a 
separation of grades at any such crossing here-
tofore or hereafter established, and to prescribe 
the terms upon which such separation shall be 
n1ade and the proportions in which the expense 
of the alteration or abolition of such crossings or 
the separation of such grades shall be divided 
between the railroad or street railroad corpora-
tions affected, or between such corporations and 
the state, county, municipality or other public 
authority in interest. 
( 3) Whenever the commission shall find 
that public convenience and necess~ty demand the 
establishment, creation or construction of a cross-
ing of a street or highway over, under or upon 
the tracks or lines of any public utility, the com-
mission may by order, decision, rule or decree 
require the establishment, construction or crea-
tion of such crossing, and such crossing shall 
thereupon become a public highway and crossing. 
Subsection 2 of the foregoing Section 54-4-15 is con-
trolling. It empowers the Public Service Commission 
where in its judgment it would be practical to require a 
separation of grades of a railroad over a highway and 
to apportion the expense of such separation between the 
railroad and the governmental subdivision involved. 
The foregoing section does not undertake to define 
what shall constitute a "railroad." 
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Subsection (9) of Section 54-2-1 defines the tenn 
"railroad" as follows: 
"(9) The term 'railroad' includes every 
commercial, interurban and other railway, other 
than a street railway, and each and every branch 
or extension thereof, by whatsoever power oper-
ated, together with all tracks, bridges, trestles, 
rights-of-way, subways, tunnels, stations, depots, 
union depots, yards, grounds, terminals, te:rminal 
facilities, structures and equipment, and all other 
real estate, fixtures and personal prope1rty of 
every kind used in connection therewith, owned, 
controlled, ·operated or managed for public ser-
vice in the transportation of persons or property." 
Casting aside language not applicable to the case at 
bar the controlling provisions appear to be· that "The 
term 'railroad' includes . . . all tracks . . . owned, oon-
trolled, operated or managed for public service in the 
transportation of persons or property." 
Does the trackage at the point of crossing fall with-
in this definition~ We think not. lllinois Powder Com-
pany in the agreement of March 29, 1940, was very 
careful to strip Rio Grande of every vestige of ownership 
or control of the trackage north of the forty-acre line. 
Clearly this trackage was not owned or controlled by Rio 
Grande. Nor was this trackage operated or managed for 
public service. The Powder Company was careful to 
prevent such use. It will be observed that the' form of 
trackage agreement employed contains a subdivision en-
titled "Use, Operation and Extension of Trackage." 
Under this subdivision the form prior to signature made 
provision for the use by Rio Grande of the trackage for 
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its own hu~inP:-;~ and the business of other shippers, and 
for the extension of the trackage to serve other shippers. 
Provi~ion was also made under another subdivision for 
grant of right of way to Rio Grande over the property 
of the Powder Company. All these provisions were 
stri<'ken out in the instnm1ent as signed by the parties. 
Thus the Powder Company made secure its ownership 
in the trac·kage and precluded the use of this trackage 
hy any other person. By the express limitations of the 
ag-reement, trackage within the boundaries of the Powder 
l ~ompany property became its own plant facility, to be 
operated and managed for its exclusive benefit. 
Nor is the portion of the spur from Rio Grande's 
main line to the forty-acre line a railroad within the 
meaning of the foregoing statute. The clause "tracks ... 
owned, controlled, operated or managed for pubJic service 
in the transportation of persons or property" is 
eonjunetive. 
The essential proposition is that any trackage to be 
part of a railroad within the meaning of the statute must 
be devoted to public service whether by ownership, con-
trol, operation or management. Had the Powder Com-
pany been willing to sign the trackage agreement in the· 
standard form the entire spur in question might thus 
have been a part of a railroad within the statutory 
definition, for then Rio Grande could have used the spur 
for its own business or for that of other shippers, or 
could have extended the same to serve others ; being de-
prived of these possible rights the entire spur, including 
the portion thereof within Rio Grande's ownership, is 
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10 
available only for the use of a single industry, it is not 
available for public service. 
In reaching this result, Rio Grande is by no means 
seeking to escape Public Service Comnlission jurisdiction 
by a device of teehnical statutory construction. The rule 
invoked here is fundamental, namely, that Public Service 
Commission jurisdiction extends only to activities which 
are carried on in public service and to facilities which are 
devoted to rendering that service. Such jurisdiction does 
not extend to services and facilities of a private nature. 
See State v. Nelson, supra, and Bamberger ElectriJc R.R. 
v. P~"blic Utilities Commission, supr.a. 
POINT II. 
THERE IS NO SUBS'TANTIAL I~VIDENCE 
~TO SUPPORT A FINDING T'HAT PLAIN-
TIFF WILL B E N E F I T FROM 'THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF T'HE HIGHWAY 
OVERPASS. 
This review, in the judgment of plaintiff, should be 
disposed of under the jurisdictional point considered 
above. In urging consideration of the second point, plain-
tiff does not in any way admit the jurisdiction of the 
Public Service Commission and consideration of this 
second point is urged upon the assumption of jurisdiction 
without in any manner admitting the same. 
The Public Service Commission gives no considera-
tion whatever to the peculiar facts, hereinabove con-
sidered, surrounding the ownership and operation of the 
spur track involved. This Commission treats the case as 
though the spur \vere under the ownership and control of 
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Hio 0 ramle. Suppose the cro~~ing were all located slight-
ly north of' its present position, and clearly within the 
<'x<·lu~ivP ownPr~hip of American Cyanamid; could an 
a.dmini8trative body then properly find that a railroad 
company, whieh svvitched cars into and out of that pro-
twrty was benefited by the separation of a grade crossing. 
\Vould not any benefit under such circumstances be en-
jny<·d by the public and the industry. The Witness 
.Johnson, ralled by the Road Commission, expressed the 
viPw that benefit should follow ownership of trackage 
(H. -t-:~). If that view were followed it would be· necessary 
for the Public Service Comission to determine who owned 
the trackage over which the structure would be built. 
This the Public Service Commission did not undertake to 
do, and because of the uncertainty of the true locatlion of 
the forty-acre line, it could not do under the evidence 
pr<'~ented. 
'rhe real answer to this pro b~em, however, is to be 
fotmd in anothet~ approach. The· entire spur track, 
whether within railroad or industry ownership, is de-
voted and necessarily devoted to the use of American 
C\anamid Company. It is not a usual or ordinary indus-
try spur. Because of these peculiar facts and circum-
stances, the spur and its crossing over the highway are 
not such as to authorize or require railroad participation 
in the cost of the structure. 
The rule is now, of course, well established by a 
~reat many decisions that a railroad company may, by 
~tatute, municipal ordinance, or the order of a regulatory 
body having jurisdiction, be required to participate in 
the erection of grade separation structures. There are, 
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12 
however, definite limrita.tions upon the, power of the State 
or one of its agencies, to impose such obligation upon a 
railroad company. The imposition of such burden must 
he fair and it must he imposed pursuant to proceedings 
which are not arbitrary or unreasonable. Moreover, the 
promotion of public convenience, will not justify requiring 
of a railroad, any more than of others, the expenditure 
of money, unless it can be shown that a duty to provide 
the particular convenience rests upon it. See Denver cf 
Rio Grande R.R. v. City and County of Denver, et al., 
250 U.S. 241, and Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 
294 U.S. 405, and many cases there, cited. 
Each case depends upon its own facts and circum-
stances. What may he fair and reasonable under one! 
set of circumstances would not be fair and reasonable 
under another set of circumstances. 
Reviewring again the case involved here, these facts 
are pertinent : As shown from the evidence, the move-
ments into and out of the plant in que,stion are conducted 
by tramp or switch cretWs operating out of Provo. The 
uniform practice pursuant to rule of Rio Grande is that 
such trains are stopped before entering the crossing. 
The speed of the trains over the crossing is therefore at 
a mrinimum. The volume of traffic across the intersection 
is light, being shown to be about eight movements into 
and out from the plant each month. The crossing is 
protected by members of the train crew, who flag the 
train across the intersection. This practice has been em-
ployed for some twenty-two years and has never resulted 
in an accident at the crossing. Moreover, this practice of 
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flagging ~nvitch movements over highways to serve in-
(lnst.ries is one which in the absence of other crossing 
protP<·tion i~ regularly and usually employed by Rio 
Gran de in the Salt Lake District. The crossing involved 
is not in a congested municipal are1a but is in open country 
located outside any city or town. If circumstances have 
now arisen which in any manner require the separation 
of grade at the crossing, these circumstances have arisen 
not bPeause of any activity whatever on the part of llio 
Grande but because of the increased burden upon the 
hig-hway arising from the use therof by persons engaged 
in the movement of persons and property ove·r the high-
way. There is no assurance whatever that the traffic 
into and out of the single industrial plant served by this 
~pur may continue for any length of time. 
The findings of the Public Service Commission ap-
twar to base railroad benefit on two grounds, namely, 
saving in time and removal of hazard. On the subject of 
hazard, the record is against the finding. After twenty-
two years of traffic over the crossing, no accident has 
orrurred. The practice employed in protecting move-
ments over the crossing is in accordance with standard 
procedure employed by plaintiff under like cros.sings in 
the Salt Lake District. Moreover, if any hazard has 
developed at the crossing, such hazard arises solely be-
cause of public use of the crossing and not because of any 
activity or conduct on the part of Rio Grande. With 
respect to the saving of time, the most that can be s·aid 
is that some momentary time is saved. There is no evi-
dence that such saving of time would result in any finan-
cial or other benefit to Rio Grande. The Public Service 
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C01nmission itself observes that it would be difficult 
to measure in dollars and cents any benefits which Rio 
Grande would enjoy by elimination of the grade crossing. 
Rio Grande under the order of the Public Service 
Commission will be required to pay something in excess 
of $10,000 as its portion of cost of the structure. We 
submit that the benefit enjoyed by Rio Grande should be 
more than trivial, it should be substantial and cognizable. 
The evidence does not disclose such benefit. 
The State Road Commission introduced a copy of a 
Policy and Procedure Memorandum of the Bureau of 
Public Roads, making provision, under certain circum-
stances, to relieve railroads from the obligation of 
contributing to the cost of grade separations over spur 
tracks. This memorandum appears not to be applicable 
here because the highway is technically not a freeway, 
nor is the memorandum binding upon the Public Service 
Commission. Nevertheless, it demonstrates the view that 
in case of certain spur tracks a railroad may enjoy no 
cognizable benefit. This we believe is the circumstance 
here. 
CONCLUSION 
The order of the PubHc Service Commission should 
be set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN GOTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCART'HY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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